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Near-Optimal Deviation-Proof Medium Access
Control Designs in Wireless Networks
Khoa Tran Phan, Jaeok Park, and Mihaela van der Schaar
Abstract—Distributed medium access control (MAC) protocols
are essential for the proliferation of low cost, decentralized
wireless local area networks (WLANs). Most MAC protocols are
designed with the presumption that nodes comply with prescribed
rules. However, selfish nodes have natural motives to manipulate
protocols in order to improve their own performance. This often
degrades the performance of other nodes as well as that of the
overall system. In this work, we propose a class of protocols
that limit the performance gain which nodes can obtain through
selfish manipulation while incurring only a small efficiency loss.
The proposed protocols are based on the idea of a review strategy,
with which nodes collect signals about the actions of other nodes
over a period of time, use a statistical test to infer whether or not
other nodes are following the prescribed protocol, and trigger a
punishment if a departure from the protocol is perceived. We
consider the cases of private and public signals and provide
analytical and numerical results to demonstrate the properties
of the proposed protocols.
Index Terms—Deviation-proof protocols, game theory, MAC
protocols, repeated games.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN WIRELESS communication networks, multiple nodesoften share a common channel and contend for access. To
resolve contention among nodes, many different MAC proto-
cols have been devised and are currently used in international
standards (e.g., IEEE 802.11a/b/g protocols) [1]. When a MAC
protocol is designed, two types of node behavior can be as-
sumed. One is cooperative nodes that comply with prescribed
protocols, and the other is selfish nodes that are capable of
manipulating prescribed protocols in order to improve their
own performance. With cooperative nodes, a MAC protocol
can be designed to optimize the system performance [2]–[6].
However, such a protocol is not robust to selfish manipulation
in that selfish nodes that can re-configure the software or
firmware may want to deviate from the protocol in pursuit of
their self-interest [7]. Thus, selfish manipulation often results
in a suboptimal outcome, different from the one desired by
the protocol designer [8]–[10]. On the other hand, a MAC
protocol can be designed assuming selfish nodes so that the
protocol is deviation-proof in the sense that selfish nodes do
not find it profitable to deviate from the protocol. However,
the incentive constraints imposed by the presence of selfish
nodes in general restrict the system performance [5], [6]. In
this paper, we aim to resolve the tension between the selfish
manipulation and optimal performance by proposing a class of
slotted MAC protocols that limit the performance gain from
selfish manipulation while incurring only a small efficiency
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loss compared to the optimal performance achievable with
cooperative nodes.
Recently, a variety of slotted MAC protocols have been
designed and analyzed using a game theoretic framework.
With cooperative nodes, protocols can be designed to achieve
system-wide optimal outcomes. In [3], a class of slotted MAC
protocols is proposed in which nodes can self-coordinate their
transmission slots based on their past transmission actions
and feedback information to achieve a time division mul-
tiple access (TDMA) outcome. In [4], the authors propose
generalized slotted Aloha protocols that maximize system
throughput given a short-term fairness constraint. In [5], [6],
variations of slotted MAC protocols with different capture
effects, prioritization, and power diversity are studied. It has
been demonstrated that with cooperative nodes one can obtain
optimal throughput and expected delay as well as system
stability.
Selfish behavior in MAC protocols has also been analyzed
using game theory. In [11], the authors establish the stability
region for a slotted Aloha system with multipacket reception
and selfish nodes. In [12], the authors study the existence of
and convergence to Nash equilibrium in a slotted Aloha system
where selfish nodes have quality-of-service requirements. It is
often observed that selfish behavior often leads to suboptimal
outcomes. For example, a prisoners’ dilemma phenomenon
arises among selfish nodes using the generalized slotted Aloha
protocols of [4]. A decrease in system throughput, especially
when the workload increases due to the selfish behavior
of nodes, is observed in [5], [6]. In the 802.11 distributed
MAC protocol, competition among selfish nodes results in an
inefficient use of the shared channel in Nash equilibria [8].
Research efforts have been made to devise MAC protocols
that sustain optimal outcomes among selfish nodes. In [13],
the authors induce selfish nodes to behave cooperatively in a
slotted random access network by introducing an intervening
node that monitors the actions of nodes and decides its
intervention level accordingly. Pricing has also been used as a
method to incentivize selfish nodes. In [5], the authors avoid
the degradation of system throughput due to selfish behavior
by adding a cost of transmissions and retransmissions. In [14],
the network charges nodes for each successfully transmitted
packet, and the authors consider the problem of adjusting
the price-per-packet to achieve a desired operating point. The
above approaches, however, require a central entity, which may
not be available in a distributed environment. In the case of an
intervention mechanism, an intervening node that is capable of
monitoring and intervening should be present in the system. In
the case of a pricing mechanism, a billing authority is needed
to charge payments depending on the usage of the network.
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In this paper, we propose an approach that decentralizes into
nodes the burden of monitoring and punishing.
To this end, we rely on the theory of repeated games
[15] to sustain cooperation among selfish nodes. When the
nodes in a system interact repeatedly, they can make their
decisions dependent on their past observations. Thus, nodes
can trigger a punishment when they observe a deviation from
a predetermined operating point. If the loss due to punishment
outweighs the gain from deviation, selfish nodes do not have
an incentive to deviate from a predetermined operating point.
The idea of using a repeated game strategy to build a deviation-
proof protocol has recently been applied to several problems in
communications and networking (see, for example, [16]–[19]).
However, most existing work assumes perfect monitoring,
where players observe decisions that other players make. With
perfect monitoring, it is relatively easy to construct a deviation-
proof protocol by using a trigger strategy, which is commonly
used to prove various versions of the Folk theorem.
In our work, we consider a scenario where the decisions
of nodes are their transmission probabilities, which cannot
be observed directly. In order to design a deviation-proof
protocol, we use the idea of a review strategy [20], [21] with
which nodes collect imperfect signals about the decisions of
other nodes, perform a statistical test to determine whether
or not a deviation has occurred, and trigger a punishment if
they conclude so. Our main contributions in this paper can be
summarized as follows.
• We model a slotted multiple access communications
scenario as a repeated game, which allows us to adopt
a repeated game strategy, including a review strategy, to
design a protocol.
• We first consider the case where nodes observe private
signals on the channel access outcomes. We design
deviation-proof protocols assuming that a deviating node
can employ only a deviation strategy using a constant
transmission probability. We provide a necessary and
sufficient condition for a given protocol to be deviation-
proof. We show that the efficiency loss of a deviation-
proof protocol can be made arbitrarily small if there is
a statistical test that becomes perfect as more signals are
accumulated.
• We also consider the case where nodes observe public
signals on the channel access outcomes. We show that
with public signals it is possible to design near-optimal
deviation-proof protocols even when nodes can use any
deviation strategy.
• Besides slotted MAC protocols, we provide a possible
application of our design methodology to the case of
CSMA/CA protocols with selfish nodes.
• We illustrate the properties of the proposed protocols with
numerical results.
The proposed protocols are fully distributed in the sense that
they need no central entity to coordinate the operation of nodes
and that nodes take actions depending solely on their own local
information without communicating with other nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we formulate a repeated game model for slotted multiple
access communications. In Section III, we propose and analyze
deviation-proof protocols based on a review strategy when
signals are private, with an example presented in Section IV.
In Section V, we investigate deviation-proof protocols when
signals are public, with an example presented in Section VI.
In Section VII, we discuss a possible extension of the proposed
protocols to a CSMA/CA network with selfish nodes. We
conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. REPEATED GAME FRAMEWORK FOR SLOTTED
MULTIPLE ACCESS COMMUNICATIONS
A. Stage Game
We consider a wireless communication network with a set
N = {1, 2, . . . , N} of N nodes interacting over time. Time is
divided into slots of equal length, and in each slot, a node has
a packet to transmit (i.e., saturated arrivals) and can attempt
to send the packet or wait. Due to interference in the shared
communication channel, a packet is transmitted successfully
only if there is no other packet transmitted in the same slot.
If more than one transmission takes place in a slot, a collision
occurs and no packet is transmitted successfully. We model
the interaction of nodes in a single slot as a non-cooperative
game in normal form, called the random access game.
The set of pure actions available to node i ∈ N in a slot
is Ai , {T,W}, where T stands for “transmit” and W for
“wait.” We denote the pure action of node i by ai ∈ Ai and a
pure action profile by a , (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ A ,
∏
i∈N Ai.
A mixed action for node i is a probability distribution on
Ai. Since there are only two pure actions, a mixed action
for node i can be represented by a transmission probability
pi ∈ [0, 1], and the set of mixed actions for node i can be
written as Pi , [0, 1]. A mixed action profile is denoted by
p , (p1, . . . , pN ) ∈ P ,
∏
i∈N Pi. The payoff function of
node i is defined by ui : A → R, where ui(a) = 1 if ai = T
and aj = W for all j 6= i and ui(a) = 0 otherwise. That is, a
node receives payoff 1 if it has a successful transmission and
0 otherwise. Then, the expected payoff of a node is given by
the probability that it has a successful transmission, and with
a slight abuse of notation, the payoff of node i when mixed
action profile p is chosen can be written as
ui(p) = pi
∏
j∈N\{i}
(1− pj).
The random access game is defined by the tuple Γ ,
〈N , (Ai)i∈N , (ui)i∈N 〉. It is well-known from the static anal-
ysis of the random access game that there is at least one node i
choosing pi = 1 at any pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE)
[9], [13]. That is, when nodes myopically maximize their own
payoffs, there is at least one node always transmitting its pack-
ets, and thus there can be at most one node obtaining a positive
payoff. Moreover, in the unique symmetric NE, every node
transmits with probability 1, which results in zero payoff for
every node. On the other hand, the symmetric Pareto optimal
(PO) outcome is achieved when each node chooses pc = 1/N ,
which yields a positive payoff uPO = (1 − 1/N)N−1/N for
every node [22]. We call pc the cooperation probability and
uPO the optimal payoff.
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B. Repeated Game
We now formulate the repeated random access game, where
the actions of a node can depend on its past observations, or
information histories. Time slots are indexed by t = 1, 2, . . ..
At the end of each slot, nodes obtain signals on the pure action
profile chosen in the slot. Let Zi be the finite set of signals
that node i can receive. Define Z ,
∏
i∈N Zi, and let Q
be a mapping from A to ∆(Z), where Q(a) represents the
distribution of signals when nodes choose pure action profile
a. A signal structure is specified by the pair (Z, Q). We say
that signals are private if there exist z , (z1, . . . , zN ) ∈ Z
and a ∈ A such that zi 6= zj for some i, j ∈ N and z
occurs with positive probability in Q(a). We say that signals
are public if they are not private. That is, signals are private
if it is possible for nodes to receive different signals, whereas
signals are public if signal realization is the same for all nodes.
The history of node i in slot t, denoted by hti, contains the
signals that node i has received by the end of slot t− 1. That
is, hti = (z0i , . . . , z
t−1
i ), for t = 1, 2, . . ., where zti represents
the signal that node i receives in slot t and z0i is set as an
arbitrary element of Zi.1 The set of slot t histories of node
i is written as Hti , and the set of all possible histories of
node i is given by Hi , ∪∞t=1Hti . The (behavior) strategy of
node i specifies a mixed action for node i in the stage game
conditional on a history it reaches. Thus, it can be represented
by a mapping σi : Hi → Pi. We use Σi to denote the set of
strategies of node i. We define a protocol as a strategy profile
σ , (σ1, . . . , σN ) ∈ Σ ,
∏
i∈N Σi. To evaluate payoffs in
the repeated game model, we use the limit of means criterion
since the length of a slot is typically short.2, A protocol σ
induces a probability distribution on the sequences of mixed
action profiles {pt}∞t=1, where pt is the mixed action profile in
slot t. The payoff of node i under protocol σ can be expressed
as
Ui(σ) = lim
J→∞
E
[
1
J
J∑
t=1
ui(p
t)
∣∣∣∣σ
]
,
assuming that the limit exists. If the limit does not exist, we
replace the operator lim by lim inf .3
We say that a signal structure (Z, Q) is symmetric if
Z1 = · · · = ZN and the signal distribution Q is preserved
under permutations of indices for nodes. With a symmetric
signal structure, we have H1 = · · · = HN and thus Σ1 =
· · · = ΣN since P1 = · · · = PN . We say that a protocol σ is
symmetric if it prescribes the same strategy to every node, i.e.,
σ1 = · · · = σN . In the remainder of this paper, we assume
that the signal structure is symmetric and focus on symmetric
protocols. Since a symmetric protocol can be represented with
1In slot t ≥ 2, node i also knows its past mixed actions (p1i , . . . , p
t−1
i )
and their realizations (a1i , . . . , a
t−1
i ). However, since we focus on repeated
game strategies using only past signals, we do not include them in our history
specification.
2For example, the slot duration of the 802.11 DCF basic access method is
20µs [1].
3Although we consider the limit of means criterion, the following results
can be extended with a complication to the case of the discounting criterion
as long as the discount factor is close to 1, as in [20]. Our analysis can also
be extended to the case where a node incurs a transmission cost whenever it
attempts transmission, as long as the cost is small.
a strategy, we use the two terms “protocol” and “strategy”
interchangeably. Also, we use U(σ1;σ2) to denote the payoff
of a node when it follows strategy σ1 while every other node
follows strategy σ2. Note that a symmetric protocol yields
the same payoff to every node, thus achieving fairness among
nodes.
C. Deviation-Proof Protocols and the Efficiency Loss
The goal of this paper is to build a protocol that fulfills
the following two requirements: (i) selfish nodes do not gain
from manipulating the protocol, and (ii) the protocol achieves
an optimal outcome. We formalize the first requirement using
the concept of deviation-proofness while evaluating the second
requirement using the concept of efficiency loss.
Definition 1: A protocol σ ∈ Σi is deviation-proof (DP)
against a strategy σ′ ∈ Σi if
U(σ;σ) ≥ U(σ′;σ).
When σ is DP against σ′, a node cannot gain by deviating to
σ′ while other nodes follow σ. Hence, if a deviating node has
only one possible deviation strategy σ′, a protocol σ that is DP
against σ′ satisfies the first requirement. However, in principle,
a deviating node can choose any strategy in Σi, in which case
we need a stronger concept than deviation-proofness.
Let Σc ⊂ Σi be the set of all constant strategies that pre-
scribe a fixed transmission probability pd, called the deviation
probability, in every slot regardless of the history.
Definition 2: A protocol σ ∈ Σi is robust ǫ-deviation-proof
(robust ǫ-DP) if
U(σ;σ) + ǫ ≥ U(σ′;σ) for all σ′ ∈ Σc.
In words, if a protocol σ is robust ǫ-DP, a node cannot gain
more than ǫ by deviating to a constant strategy using a fixed
deviation probability. If there is a fixed cost of manipulating
a given protocol and a deviation strategy is constrained to
constant strategies, then a robust ǫ-DP protocol can prevent
a deviation by having ǫ smaller than the cost. When there is
no restriction on possible deviation strategies, the following
concept is relevant.
Definition 3: A protocol σ ∈ Σi is ǫ-Nash equilibrium (ǫ-
NE) if
U(σ;σ) + ǫ ≥ U(σ′;σ) for all σ′ ∈ Σi.
We define the system payoff as the sum of the payoffs of
all the nodes in the system. Then, the system payoff when
all nodes follow a protocol σ is given by V (σ) , NU(σ;σ).
Since NuPO is the maximum system payoff in the stage game
achievable with a symmetric action profile, we measure the
efficiency loss from using a protocol by the following concept.
Definition 4: The efficiency loss of a protocol σ ∈ Σi is
defined as
C(σ) = NuPO − V (σ). (1)
Definition 5: A protocol σ ∈ Σi is δ-Pareto optimal (δ-PO)
if
C(σ) ≤ δ.
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TABLE I
MAIN RESULTS
Section Signal Test Robustness to selfish manipulation Optimality
III (Proposition 2) Private (general) Asymptotically perfect test DP against a strategy using δ-PO
a constant transmission probability
IV (Theorem 2) Private (ACK feedback) ACK ratio test robust ǫ-DP δ-PO
V (Proposition 5) Public (general) Asymptotically perfect test DP against a strategy using a constant δ-POtransmission probability in a review phase
VI (Theorem 4) Public (ternary feedback) Idle slot ratio test ǫ-NE δ-PO
A δ-PO protocol is a protocol that yields an efficiency loss
less than or equal to δ. Let σc be the strategy that prescribes
the cooperation probability pc in every slot regardless of
the history.4 Then U(σc;σc) = uPO, and thus σc achieves
full efficiency (i.e., 0-PO). However, σc is not DP against a
constant deviation strategy with pd > pc as a deviating node
can increase its payoff from pc(1−pc)N−1 to pd(1−pc)N−1.
We construct DP protocols that achieve a near-optimal system
payoff in the following sections, whose main results are
summarized in Table I.
III. DEVIATION-PROOF PROTOCOLS WHEN SIGNALS ARE
PRIVATE
A. Description of Protocols with Private Signals
In this section, we consider private signals. As pointed
out in [23], when signals are private, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to construct a NE that has a simple structure and
is easy to compute. Thus, we focus on a simpler problem
of constructing a DP protocol against a constant deviation
strategy σd ∈ Σc. Since a simple protocol such as σc is
DP against σd with pd ∈ [0, pc], we restrict our attention to
deviation strategies with pd ∈ (pc, 1]. Note that the restriction
to constant deviation strategies is relevant when a deviating
node has a limited deviation capability in the sense that it can
reset its transmission probability only at the beginning.
We build a protocol based on a review strategy. When a node
uses a review strategy, it starts from a review phase for which
it transmits with probability pc and collects signals. When the
review phase ends, the node performs a statistical test whose
null hypothesis is that every node transmitted with probability
pc during the review phase, using the collected signals. Then,
the node moves to a reciprocation phase for which it transmits
with probability pc (cooperation phase) if the test is passed
and with probability 1 (punishment phase) if the test fails.
When the reciprocation phase ends, a new review phase begins.
A review strategy, denoted by σr, can be characterized by
three elements, (R,L,M), where R is a statistical test, and
L and M are natural numbers that represent the lengths of a
review phase and a reciprocation phase, respectively. Thus,
we sometimes write σr as σr(R,L,M). With a protocol
based on review strategy σr(R,L,M), each node performs
the statistical test R after slot l(L + M) + L based on the
signals (zl(L+M)+1i , . . . , z
l(L+M)+L
i ) collected in the recent
review phase, for l = 0, 1, . . .. A schematic representation of
a review strategy with private signals is provided in Fig. 1.
4Note that σc corresponds to a slotted Aloha protocol that does not
distinguish new and backlogged packets as in [12].
R i h (L l t )ev ew p ase s o s
(cooperate and 
collect signals)
Statistical test
fail pass
Punishment Cooperation
phase
(M slots)
phase
(M slots)
Fig. 1. Review strategy with private signals
The review strategies in [20] differ from the review strate-
gies described above in that in [20] a new review phase begins
without having a reciprocation phase if the test is passed. A
key difference between the model of [20] and ours is that in
the principal-agent model of [20] only the principal reviews
the performance of the agent whereas in our model multiple
nodes simultaneously review the performance of other nodes.
When signals are private, nodes do not know the results of
the test performed by other nodes. Hence, without a recipro-
cation phase followed by a successful review, nodes cannot
distinguish a deviating node from a punishing node and thus
cannot coordinate to begin a new review phase. This problem
can be avoided when signals are public, because the results
of the test are the same across nodes in the case of public
signals.5 Thus, a review strategy is modified accordingly in
Section V, where we consider public signals.
B. Analysis of Protocols with Private Signals
1) Existence of Deviation-Proof Protocols: For the sake of
analysis, we consider a fixed constant deviation strategy σd ∈
Σc and the corresponding deviation probability pd ∈ (pc, 1].
Given a symmetric protocol that prescribes a review strategy,
we can compute two probabilities of errors.
• False punishment probability Pf (R,L): probability that
there is at least one node whose test fails after a review
phase when nodes follow a protocol σr.
• Miss detection probability Pm(R,L; pd): probability that
there is no node among those following σr whose test
fails after a review phase when there is exactly one node
deviating to σd.
5Alternatively, this problem can be avoided by having a node that has a
failed test broadcast that it moves to a punishment phase, as in [21]. However,
this requires communication among nodes, which we do not allow in this
paper.
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Since the payoff of every node is zero when there are two
or more punishing nodes, we need to have a small false
punishment probability to achieve a small efficiency loss. On
the other hand, in order to punish a deviating node effectively,
we need to have a small miss detection probability. Indeed, as
will be shown in Proposition 2, achieving small Pf and Pm
is sufficient to design a near-optimal DP protocol.
The payoff of a node when every node follows a review
strategy σr is given by
U(σr;σr) =
(1− pc)
N−1
L+M
(
pcL+ pc (1− Pf )M
+
(
(1− Pf )
N−1
N
(
1− (1− Pf )
1
N
))
M
)
.
The payoff of a node choosing deviation strategy σd while
other nodes follow σr is given by
U(σd;σr) =
pd(1− pc)N−1
L+M
(L+ PmM) .
By Definition 1, σr is DP against σd if and only if
U(σr;σr) ≥ U(σd;σr). (2)
The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient
condition for a review strategy to be DP against σd.
Theorem 1: Given pd ∈ (pc, 1], protocol σr(R,L,M) is
DP against σd if and only if g(R,L; pd) > 0 and M ≥
Mmin(R,L; pd), where
g(R,L; pd) , (1− Pf (R,L))
N−1
N − (1− pc) (1− Pf (R,L))
− pdPm(R,L; pd) (3)
and
Mmin(R,L; pd) ,
(pd − pc)L
g(R,L; pd)
.
Proof: Note that the net payoff gain from deviating to the
deviation strategy σd is given by
U(σd;σr)− U(σr;σr)
=
(1− pc)
N−1
L+M
(
(pd − pc)L− g(R,L; pd)M
)
. (4)
The first term in (4) is the gain during a review phase while
the second term is the loss during a reciprocation phase.
By (2), σr is DP against σd if and only if (pd − pc)L ≤
g(R,L; pd)M . It is easy to check that g(R,L; pd) > 0 and
M ≥ Mmin(R,L; pd) imply (pd − pc)L ≤ g(R,L; pd)M .
Suppose that (pd−pc)L ≤ g(R,L; pd)M . Since (pd−pc)L >
0, we must have g(R,L; pd) > 0, which in turn implies
M ≥Mmin(R,L; pd).
Theorem 1 shows that for a given statistical test R, we
can construct a DP protocol based on the test if and only if
there exists a natural number L such that g(R,L; pd) > 0.
Once we find such L, we can use it as the length of a
review phase and then choose a natural number M satisfying
M ≥ Mmin(R,L; pd) to determine the length of a recipro-
cation phase. An immediate consequence of Theorem 1 is
that if protocol σr(R,L,M) is DP against σd, then protocol
σr(R,L,M ′) with M ′ ≥ M is also DP against σd. Thus,
Mmin(R,L; pd) can be interpreted as the minimum length of a
reciprocation phase to make σr(R,L,M) DP against σd. The
following result provides a sufficient condition on R under
which we can find L such that g(R,L; pd) > 0 and thus a DP
protocol based on R can be constructed.
Corollary 1: Given pd ∈ (pc, 1], suppose that R satisfies
limL→∞ Pf (R,L) = 0 and limL→∞ Pm(R,L; pd) = 0. Then
there exists L such that g(R,L; pd) > 0.
Proof: By (3), limL→∞ Pf (R,L) = 0 and
limL→∞ Pm(R,L; pd) = 0 imply that limL→∞ g(R,L; pd) =
pc > 0. Thus, g(R,L; pd) > 0 for sufficiently large L.
Combining Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we can see that
if test R is “asymptotically perfect” in the sense that the
two probabilities of errors converge to zero as the test is
performed using more signals, then we can always design a
review strategy based on R that is DP against σd.
2) Near-Optimal Deviation-Proof Protocols: Suppose that
every node follows a review strategy σr . Since signals provide
only imperfect information about the transmission probabil-
ities of other nodes, it is possible that a punishment is
triggered, which results in an efficiency loss as confirmed in
the following proposition. We use Σr to denote the set of all
review strategies with private signals.
Proposition 1: C(σr) ≥ 0 for all σr ∈ Σr (with equality if
and only if Pf = 0).
Proof: Fix a protocol σr(R,L,M) ∈ Σr. By (1), we can
express the efficiency loss of σr as
C(σr) =
NM
L+M
(1− pc)
N−1
(
pcPf − (1 − Pf )
N−1
N + (1 − Pf )
)
. (5)
Since (1 − Pf )
N−1
N is concave, we have (1− Pf )
N−1
N ≤ 1−
N−1
N Pf for Pf ∈ [0, 1], with equality if and only if Pf = 0.
Using pc = 1/N , we obtain the result.
Proposition 1 says that there is always a positive efficiency
loss resulting from a review strategy unless there is a perfect
statistical test in the sense that punishment is never triggered
when every node follows σr (i.e., Pf = 0). Punishment results
in an efficiency loss because the system payoff is the same
as NuPO when there is only one punishing node while it is
zero when there are two or more. Hence, a longer punishment
induces a larger efficiency loss. As can be seen from (5),
for given R and L, C(σr) is non-decreasing (and increasing
if Pf > 0) in M . Therefore, if we find (R,L) such that
g(R,L; pd) > 0, choosing M = ⌈Mmin(R,L; pd)⌉ minimizes
the efficiency loss while having σr(R,L,M) DP against σd,
where ⌈·⌉ denotes the ceiling function. This observation allows
us to reduce the design choice from (R,L,M) to (R,L). The
following proposition provides a sufficient condition on the
statistical test for constructing a near-optimal DP protocol.
Proposition 2: Given pd ∈ (pc, 1], suppose that R satisfies
limL→∞ Pf (R,L) = 0 and limL→∞ Pm(R,L; pd) = 0. Then
for any δ > 0, there exist L and M such that σr(R,L,M) is
DP against σd and δ-PO.
Proof: Since limL→∞ g(R,L; pd) = pc > 0, there exists
L1 such that g(R,L; pd) > 0 for all L ≥ L1. By Theorem 1,
σr(R,L, ⌈Mmin(R,L; pd)⌉) is DP against σd for all L ≥ L1.
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Since C(σr) is non-decreasing in M , we have
0 ≤ C(σr) ≤
N (Mmin(R,L; pd) + 1)
L+ (Mmin(R,L; pd) + 1)
(1− pc)
N−1
[
pcPf − (1 − Pf )
N−1
N + (1− Pf )
]
. (6)
Note that limL→∞Mmin(R,L; pd)/L = (pd − pc)/pc, and
thus the right-hand side of (6) converges to zero as L goes to
infinity, which implies limL→∞ C(σr) = 0. Therefore, there
exists L2 such that C(σr) < δ for all L ≥ L2. Choose L ≥
max{L1, L2} and M = ⌈Mmin(R,L; pd)⌉ to obtain a protocol
with the desired properties.
Proposition 2 shows that the efficiency loss of a DP protocol
can be made arbitrarily small when there is an asymptotically
perfect statistical test. It also points out a trade-off between
optimality and implementation cost. In order to make the
efficiency loss within a small desired level, L should be chosen
sufficiently large, which requires large M by the relationship
M = ⌈Mmin(R,L; pd)⌉. At the same time, as L and M
become larger, each node needs to maintain longer memory to
execute a review strategy, which can be considered as higher
implementation cost.
We make a couple of remarks. First, the constructed DP
protocols are DP against multiple nodes deviating to σd.
The payoff gain from deviation decreases with the number
of deviating nodes. Hence, if a protocol can deter a single
node from deviating to σd, it can also deter multiple nodes
from doing so. Second, the constructed DP protocols are
DP against a more general class of deviation strategies with
which a permanent deviation to pd occurs in an arbitrary slot
(determined deterministically or randomly). A deviating node
cannot gain starting from a review phase after a deviation
occurs, and without discounting its temporary gain is smaller
than the perpetual loss.
IV. PROTOCOLS BASED ON THE ACK RATIO TEST
A. Description of the ACK Signal Structure and Protocols
Based on the ACK Ratio Test
In this section, we illustrate the results in Section III
by considering a particular signal structure and a particular
statistical test. In the slotted Aloha protocol in [24], a node
receives an acknowledgement (ACK) signal if it transmits its
packet successfully and no signal otherwise. In the ACK signal
structure, the signal space can be written as Zi = {S, F}, for
all i ∈ N , where zi = S means that node i receives an ACK
signal and F means that it does not. We assume that there
is no error in the transmission and reception of ACK signals.
The signal distribution Q is such that Q(a) puts probability
mass 1 on z ∈ Z with zi = S and zj = F for all j 6= i
if ai = T and aj = W for all j 6= i, for each i ∈ N , and
probability mass 1 on zi = F for all i otherwise. Since it is
possible for nodes to receive different signals (only one node
receives signal S when a success occurs), ACK signals are
private.
In a review strategy with the ACK signal structure, a node
uses its ACK signals collected in a review phase to perform a
statistical test. We propose a particular statistical test called the
ACK ratio test. The test statistic of the ACK ratio test is the
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Fig. 2. Automaton representation of a review strategy based on the ACK
ratio test with parameters satisfying 1 ≤ L(qc −B) < 2.
ratio of the number of ACK signals obtained in a review phase
to the length of a review phase, i.e.,
∑L
k=1 χ{z
τ+k
i = S}/L,
where χ is an indicator function and τ + 1 represents a slot
when a review phase begins. The test is passed if the statistic
exceeds a threshold value, qc−B, where qc , pc(1− pc)N−1
and B ∈ (0, qc), and fails otherwise. Note that qc is the
expected value of the ACK ratio when every node transmits
with probability pc. If there is a deviating node, the ACK ratio
tends to be smaller because its expected value is reduced to
qd , pc(1−pc)N−2(1−pd). The ACK ratio test is designed to
distinguish between these two events statistically while having
B as a “margin of error.” Since the ACK ratio test can be
identified with B, we use B instead of R to represent the
ACK ratio test.
A review strategy based on the ACK ratio test, σr(B,L,M),
can be represented formally as follows:
σr(hti) =


pc, t ∈ [l(L+M) + 1, l(L+M) + L],
1, t ∈ [l(L+M) + L+ 1, (l+ 1)(L+M)],∑l(L+M)+L
k=l(L+M)+1 χ{z
k
i = S}/L ≤ qc −B
pc, t ∈ [l(L+M) + L+ 1, (l+ 1)(L+M)],∑l(L+M)+L
k=l(L+M)+1 χ{z
k
i = S}/L > qc −B
for l = 0, 1, . . .. Fig. 2 shows an automaton representation of
the review strategy σr for 1 ≤ L(qc −B) < 2 so that a node
triggers punishment if it obtains less than two successes in
a review phase. Each state transition is labeled by the set of
signals that induce the transition. In a reciprocation phase, a
node goes through either states P1 to PM (punishment phase)
or states C1 to CM (cooperation phase) depending on the
number of ACK signals obtained in the review phase. Note
that the number of states in the automaton representation of
protocol σr(B,L,M) is given by Ns(σr) = kL − k(k −
1)/2 + 2M , where k ≥ 2 is the natural number satisfying
k − 2 ≤ L(qc −B) < k − 1.
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B. Analytical Results
Let F (y;n, p) be the cumulative distribution function of a
binomial random variable with total number of trials n and
probability of success p, i.e.,
F (y;n, p) =
⌊y⌋∑
m=0
(
n
m
)
pm(1− p)n−m,
where ⌊·⌋ denotes the floor function. Suppose that every node
transmits with probability pc in a review phase. Then, the
number of ACK signals that a node receives in the review
phase follows a binomial distribution with parameters L and
qc. Thus, the probability that a punishment is triggered by
node i is given by
Pr
{
L∑
k=1
χ{zτ+ki = S}/L ≤ qc −B
}
= F (L(qc −B);L, qc),
and the false punishment probability is given by
Pf (B,L) = 1− [1− F (L(qc −B);L, qc)]
N
.
Suppose that there is exactly one deviating node using σd, i.e.,
transmitting with probability pd in a review phase. Then, the
success probability in the binomial distribution changes to qd,
and thus the miss detection probability is given by
Pm(B,L; pd) = [1− F (L(qc −B);L, qd)]
N−1
.
The monotonicity of Pf and Pm with respect to the test
parameter B is readily obtained.
Proposition 3: Given pd ∈ (pc, 1] and L, Pf (B,L) and
Pm(B,L; pd) are non-increasing and non-decreasing in B ∈
(0, qc), respectively.
Proof: The proof is straightforward by noting that
F (L(qc − B);L, qc) and F (L(qc − B);L, qd) are non-
increasing in B ∈ (0, qc).
As the margin of error is larger, it is more likely that the
test is passed, yielding a smaller false punishment probability
and a larger miss detection probability. The following lemma
examines the asymptotic properties of Pf and Pm as L
becomes large.
Lemma 1: Given pd ∈ (pc, 1], limL→∞ Pf (B,L) = 0
for all B ∈ (0, qc), limL→∞ Pm(B,L; pd) = 0 for all
B ∈ (0, qc − qd), and limL→∞ Pm(B,L; pd) = 1 for all
B ∈ (qc − qd, qc).
Proof: Since χ{zτ+ki = S}, for k = 1, . . . , L, can be
considered as L i.i.d. random variables, we can apply the
strong law of large numbers to the ACK ratio [25]. When every
node transmits with probability pc, the ACK ratio converges
almost surely to qc as L goes to infinity, which implies that
the false punishment probability goes to zero for all B > 0.
When there is exactly one node transmitting with probability
pd, the ACK ratio of a node transmitting with probability pc
converges almost surely to qd as L goes to infinity. Hence, if
qd < qc−B (resp. qd > qc−B), the miss detection probability
goes to zero (resp. one).
Lemma 1 provides a sufficient condition on the ACK ratio
test to apply Proposition 2.
Proposition 4: Suppose that B ∈ (0, qc − qd). For any δ >
0, there exist L and M such that σr(B,L,M) is DP against
σd and δ-PO.
Proof: The proposition follows from Lemma 1 and Propo-
sition 2.
Proposition 4 states that for given pd ∈ (pc, 1], we can
construct a protocol σr that is DP against σd and achieves an
arbitrarily small PoS by setting B such that 0 < B < qc−qd =
pc(1− pc)N−2(pd − pc). Note that as pd is larger, it is easier
to detect a deviation, and thus we have a wider range of B
that renders deviation-proofness and near-optimality.
So far we have considered a constant deviation strategy σd
prescribing a fixed deviation probability pd and designed a
protocol that is DP against σd. However, it is natural to regard
pd as a choice by a deviating node, and thus in principle it
can be any probability. Now we allow the possibility that a
deviating node can use any constant deviation strategy, and we
obtain the following result.
Theorem 2: For any ǫ > 0 and δ > 0, there exist B, L, and
M such that σr(B,L,M) is robust ǫ-DP and δ-PO.
Proof: The proof is relegated to Appendix A.
We can interpret ǫ and δ as performance requirements. Re-
quiring smaller ǫ makes protocols more robust while requiring
smaller δ results in a higher system payoff. In addition to the
trade-off between optimality and implementation cost already
mentioned following Proposition 2, we can identify a similar
trade-off between robustness and implementation cost in that
smaller ǫ in general requires larger L and M to construct a
robust ǫ-DP protocol.
C. Numerical Results
To provide numerical results, we consider a network with
5 nodes, i.e., N = 5 and pc = 1/N = 0.2. Fig. 3 plots the
false punishment probability Pf (B,L) and the miss detection
probability Pm(B,L; pd) while varying the length of a review
phase L. Fig. 3(a) shows that Pf (B,L) exhibits a decreasing
tendency as L increases, with discontinuities occurring at the
points where the floor function of L(qc − B) has a jump.
We can also see that Pf is smaller for larger B, as shown in
Proposition 3. The upper threshold for the parameterB to yield
limL→∞ Pm(R,L; pd) = 0 in Lemma 1 is qc − qd = 0.0512
for pd = 0.7. We can see from Fig. 3(b) that Pm(B,L; pd)
approaches 0 as L becomes large when B is smaller than
this threshold, whereas it approaches 1 when B exceeds the
threshold. Fig. 3(b) also shows that, for fixed B, Pm(B,L; pd)
is smaller for larger pd, i.e., as the deviation becomes greedier,
it is more likely to be detected.
Fig. 4 plots the relationship between the length of a review
phase L and the minimum length of a reciprocation phase
⌈Mmin(B,L; pd)⌉ to have a DP protocol for different values
of B and pd. In Fig. 4(a), we fix pd = 0.7 and consider
B = 0.04 and 0.06. Note that when B = 0.06, some values
of L result in large minimum values of M , which are not
displayed in Fig. 4(a). Also, the values of L with which no
DP protocol can be constructed for given B and pd (i.e.,
g(B,L; pd) ≤ 0) are indicated with ⌈Mmin(B,L; pd)⌉ = 0
in Fig. 4(a). For example, we cannot construct a DP protocol
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Fig. 3. Pf (B,L) and Pm(B,L; pd) versus the length of a review phase L.
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Fig. 5. Efficiency loss C(σr) versus the length of a review phase L: (a) pd = 0.7, and (b) B = 0.04.
using L such that 42 ≤ L ≤ 45 or 84 ≤ L ≤ 91
when B = 0.06 and pd = 0.7. When B = 0.04, we can
construct a DP protocol using any L ≥ 10. In Fig. 4(b),
we fix B = 0.04 and consider pd = 0.7 and 0.85. For the
considered values of pd, we observe that the minimum length
of a reciprocation phase is increasing in pd for the most values
of L. Also, in general, a longer review phase requires a longer
reciprocation phase for fixed pd although a reverse relationship
may be obtained, especially when L is small. Note that L and
⌈Mmin(B,L; pd)⌉ have a linear relationship in the limit since
limL→∞Mmin(B,L; pd)/L = (pd − pc)/pc.
Fig. 5 plots efficiency loss C(σr) against the length of a
review phase L when the length of a reciprocation phase is
chosen as ⌈Mmin(B,L; pd)⌉ for different values of B and pd.
The points where efficiency loss is shown as 0 in Fig. 5(a)
are where no DP protocol exists for the given parameters.
We can observe that as L increases, efficiency loss tends to
decrease to 0, which is consistent with Proposition 4. Fig.
5(a) shows that for fixed pd = 0.7, efficiency loss is smaller
when B = 0.06 than when B = 0.04. This is because the
false punishment probability of the former case is smaller than
that of the latter case as shown in Fig. 3(a). Fig. 5(b) shows
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TABLE II
PARAMETERS AND THE EFFICIENCY LOSS OF OPTIMAL PROTOCOLS
pd 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
(L,M) (22,101) (23,101) (23,94) (23,91) (23,90) (23,92) (23,96) (23,102) (22,106)
C(σr) 0.0570 0.0490 0.0483 0.0480 0.0479 0.0481 0.0485 0.0490 0.0575
that efficiency loss is almost the same for the two considered
deviation probabilities when B = 0.04.
D. Deviation-Proof Protocols with Complexity Considerations
1) Protocol Design Problem with a Complexity Constraint:
So far we have explored the possibility of constructing near-
optimal deviation-proof protocols based on a review strategy.
We mention briefly how to incorporate complexity consid-
erations in the protocol design problem. One approach to
measure the complexity of a repeated game strategy is to
use the number of the states of the smallest automaton that
can implement the strategy [26]. Thus, we can formulate the
following protocol design problem, assuming that the deviation
strategy is fixed as σd.
minimize C(σr(B,L,M))
subject to σr is DP against σd (7)
Ns(σ
r) ≤ Ns
The second constraint can be interpreted as a complexity
constraint which bounds the number of states in the automaton
representation of σr. Without a complexity constraint, effi-
ciency loss can be made arbitrarily small while satisfying the
first constraint by choosing sufficiently large L, as shown in
Proposition 4. Thus, the second constraint prevents L from
growing without bound.
2) Protocol Design Method: We propose a method to find
an optimal protocol that solves the protocol design problem
(7).
• Step 1. Determine a finite set B ⊂ (0, qc) as the set of
possible values of B.
• Step 2. Fix B ∈ B. Identify the set of feasible (L,M) in
the sense that (L,M) satisfies the second constraint of
(7) given B.
• Step 3. Fix feasible L, and check whether g(B,L; pd) in
(3) is positive. If so, choose M as the smallest feasible
value of M larger than or equal to Mmin(B,L; pd),
which we denote by M(B,L), if such a value exists.
Then, σr(B,L,M(B,L)) is a protocol that satisfies both
constraints of (7).
• Step 4. By varying B and L, obtain protocols that
satisfy both constraints. Among these protocols, choose
a protocol that yields the smallest efficiency loss.
As an illustrative example, we consider N = 5 and set
Ns = 2
8 = 256 so that protocols can be implemented using 8-
bit memory. For simplicity, we fix B at 0.04, i.e., B = {0.04}.
Table II presents the parameters (L,M) and the efficiency loss
of optimal protocols for different deviation probabilities. We
can see that the optimal protocols have different parameters
for different values of pd. Due to jumps in the efficiency
loss curves as shown in Fig. 5, the optimal protocols do not
necessarily have the longest possible review phase.
V. DEVIATION-PROOF PROTOCOLS WHEN SIGNALS ARE
PUBLIC
A. Motivation
As mentioned in Section III-A, when signals are private,
nodes do not know the results of the test that other nodes
perform. Hence, nodes need to have a reciprocation phase
regardless of the results of the test in order to synchronize
the beginning of a review phase across nodes. However, this
structure of a review strategy creates a weakness that can be
exploited by a deviating node. A deviating node can cooperate
in a review phase to avoid punishment and then defect in a
reciprocation phase to obtain a payoff gain. To exclude such
a “smart” deviation, in Sections III and IV we have focused
on constant deviation strategies when designing DP protocols.
However, this complication does not arise when signals are
public. Since the result of the test is commonly known among
nodes, a reciprocation phase can be skipped when the test
is passed, eliminating the room for exploitation. This added
robustness of protocols with public signals can be regarded
as the value of public signals when the signal structure is a
design choice.
B. Description of Protocols with Public Signals
When signals are public, nodes receive a common signal,
and thus we use zt, without subscript i, to denote the signal
in slot t. A review strategy with public signals is the same
as the one described in Section III-A except that there is
no cooperation phase. That is, a new review phase begins
immediately if the statistical test is passed. If the test fails,
a punishment phase occurs as before. Since we focus on
symmetric protocols, all nodes use the same statistical test and
perform the test based on the same signals. Hence, all nodes
obtain the same result of the test, and thus they are always
in the same phase. We use σ˜r(R,L,M) to denote the review
strategy with public signals that uses test R and has L and
M as the lengths of a review phase and a punishment phase,
respectively.
C. Analysis of Protocols with Public Signals
We first consider a fixed deviation strategy σ˜d that has the
same structure as the prescribed review strategy σ˜r . That is, a
deviating node transmits with probability pd in a review phase
and with pr in a punishment phase. Since no node obtains a
positive payoff in a punishment phase, the choice of pr does
not affect the analysis, and thus for analysis only pd matters.
For the same reason as in Section III, we focus on the case
where pd > pc.
As in the case of private signals, we can compute two prob-
abilities of errors: the false punishment probability P˜f (R,L)
and the miss detection probability P˜m(R,L; pd). Since a
PHAN, PARK, AND VAN DER SCHAAR: NEAR-OPTIMAL DEVIATION-PROOF MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL DESIGNS IN WIRELESS NETWORKS 10
punishment phase occurs with probability P˜f and results in
zero payoff for every node when all nodes follow a review
strategy, we have
U(σ˜r ; σ˜r) =
Lqc
L+ P˜fM
.
Note that (L+P˜fM) is the average length of an epoch, defined
as a review phase and the following punishment phase if one
exists, and Lqc is the accumulated expected payoff for a node
in an epoch. The payoff of a node choosing deviation strategy
σ˜d while other nodes follow σ˜r is given by
U(σ˜d; σ˜r) =
Lqd
L+ (1− P˜m)M
.
The efficiency loss of σ˜r can be computed as
C(σ˜r) =
NP˜fMqc
L+ P˜fM
, (8)
which is always nonnegative (positive if P˜f > 0). Note that the
nonnegativity of the efficiency loss does not require pc = 1/N ,
unlike in the case of private signals (see Proposition 1). The
following theorem is an analogue of Theorem 1 for the case
of public signals.
Theorem 3: Given pd ∈ (pc, 1], protocol σ˜r(R,L,M) is
DP against σ˜d if and only if g˜(R,L; pd) > 0 and M ≥
M˜min(R,L; pd), where
g˜(R,L; pd) , pc
(
1− P˜m(R,L; pd)
)
− pdP˜f (R,L)
and
M˜min(R,L; pd) ,
(pd − pc)L
g˜(R,L; pd)
.
Proof: U(σ˜r; σ˜r) ≥ U(σ˜d; σ˜r) if and only if (pd −
pc)L ≤ g˜(R,L; pd)M . Note that (1 − pc)N−1(pd − pc)L
is the gain from deviation in a review phase while (1 −
pc)
N−1g˜(R,L; pd)M is the expected loss from deviation in
a punishment phase. The result can be obtained by using a
similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 shows that for a given statistical test R, we can
construct a DP protocol based on the test if and only if there
exists a natural number L such that g˜(R,L; pd) > 0. Once we
find such L, we can use it as the length of a review phase
and then choose M larger than or equal to M˜min(R,L; pd)
to determine the length of a punishment phase. Since C(σ˜r)
is non-decreasing in M for fixed R and L as can be seen
from (8), the efficiency loss is minimized for given (R,L)
by setting M = ⌈M˜min(R,L; pd)⌉ so that the length of a
punishment phase is just enough to prevent deviation. Again,
this observation reduces the design choices for a review
strategy from (R,L,M) to (R,L). The next result is an
analogue of Proposition 2, showing that if an asymptotically
perfect statistical test is available, we can construct a near-
optimal DP protocol.
Proposition 5: Given pd ∈ (pc, 1], suppose that R satisfies
limL→∞ P˜f (R,L) = 0 and limL→∞ P˜m(R,L; pd) = 0. Then
for any δ > 0, there exist L and M such that σ˜r(R,L,M) is
DP against σ˜d and δ-PO.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2, and
thus is omitted for brevity.
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Fig. 6. Automaton representation of a review strategy based on the idle slot
ratio test with parameters satisfying 1 ≤ L(q˜c −B) < 2.
VI. PROTOCOLS BASED ON THE IDLE SLOT RATIO TEST
A. Description of the Ternary Signal Structure and Protocols
Based on the Idle Slot Ratio Test
To illustrate the results in Section V, we consider the ternary
signal structure as in [27], [28], whose signal space can be
written as Z = {0, 1, e}. Nodes receive signal 0 if the slot
is idle, 1 if there is a success, and e if there is a collision.
Signals under the ternary signal structure are public because
nodes always receive a common signal. We consider a review
strategy with which nodes use the fraction of idle slots in a
review phase, or the idle slot ratio, as the test statistics. If
every node transmits with probability pc, the expected value
of the idle slot ratio is q˜c , (1 − pc)N . On the other hand,
if there is exactly one deviating node that transmits with
probability pd during a review phase, the expected value is
reduced to q˜d , (1− pd)(1− pc)N−1. The idle slot ratio test
is passed if the idle slot ratio,
∑L
k=1 χ{z
τ+k = 0}/L, exceeds
a threshold value, q˜c − B, and fails otherwise. Fig. 6 shows
an automaton representation of a review strategy σ˜r whose
parameters satisfying 1 ≤ L(q˜c − B) < 2. State transition
occurs depending on the received signals, as depicted in Fig. 6.
When a review phase ends, nodes either start a new review
phase or move to a punishment phase depending on whether
the number of idle slots in the review phase exceeds L(q˜c−B)
or not.
B. Analytical Results
Suppose that every node follows a review strategy based
on the idle slot ratio test, σ˜r(B,L,M). Then, every node
transmits with probability pc in a review phase, and the
number of idle slots occurring in a review phase follows a
binomial distribution with parameters L and q˜c. Thus, the false
punishment probability is given by
P˜f (B,L) = F (L(q˜c −B);L, q˜c).
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Since a deviating node using transmission probability pd
changes the “success probability” of the binomial distribution
from q˜c to q˜d, the miss detection probability is given by
P˜m(B,L; pd) = 1− F (L(q˜c −B);L, q˜d).
The monotonicity of P˜f and P˜m with respect to the margin
of error B is stated as follows.
Proposition 6: Given pd ∈ (pc, 1] and L, P˜f (B,L) and
P˜m(B,L; pd) are non-increasing and non-decreasing in B ∈
(0, q˜c), respectively.
Proof: The proof is straightforward by noting that
F (L(q˜c−B);L, q˜c) and F (L(q˜c−B);L, q˜d) is non-increasing
in B ∈ (0, q˜c).
The next lemma examines the asymptotic properties of P˜f
and P˜m as L becomes large.
Lemma 2: Given pd ∈ (pc, 1], limL→∞ P˜f (B,L) = 0
for all B ∈ (0, q˜c), limL→∞ P˜m(B,L; pd) = 0 for all
B ∈ (0, q˜c − q˜d), and limL→∞ P˜m(B,L; pd) = 1 for all
B ∈ (q˜c − q˜d, q˜c).
Proof: We use the same approach as in the proof of
Lemma 1. When every node transmits with probability pc,
the idle slot ratio converges almost surely to q˜c as L goes to
infinity, which implies that the false punishment probability
goes to zero for all B > 0. When there is exactly one node
transmitting with probability pd, the idle slot ratio converges
almost surely to q˜d as L goes to infinity. Hence, if q˜d < q˜c−B
(resp. q˜d > q˜c−B), the miss detection probability goes to zero
(resp. one).
Lemma 2 gives a sufficient condition on the idle slot ratio
test to apply Proposition 5.
Proposition 7: Suppose that B ∈ (0, q˜c − q˜d). For any δ >
0, there exist L and M such that σ˜r(B,L,M) is DP against
σ˜d and δ-PO.
Proof: The proposition follows from Lemma 2 and Propo-
sition 5.
Proposition 7 states that for given pd ∈ (pc, 1], we can
always construct a protocol based on the idle slot ratio test that
is DP against σ˜d and achieves an arbitrarily small efficiency
loss by choosing B such that 0 < B < q˜c− q˜d = (pd−pc)(1−
pc)
N−1
. As in the case of the ACK ratio test, we have a wider
range of B that renders deviation-proofness as pd is larger.
We have considered deviation strategies that prescribe a
constant transmission probability in a review phase. We now
consider the case where a deviating node can use any strategy
in Σi, which includes strategies that adjust transmission proba-
bilities depending on the signals obtained in the current review
phase. The following theorem shows that we can construct a
protocol based on the idle slot ratio test that is deviation-proof
and near-optimal.
Theorem 4: For any ǫ > 0 and δ > 0, there exist B, L, and
M such that σ˜r(B,L,M) is ǫ-NE and δ-PO.
Proof: The proof is relegated to Appendix B.
The interpretation of ǫ and δ as performance requirements as
well as the trade-off between performance and implementation
cost, as discussed following Theorem 2, is still valid in the case
of public signals.
Remark: Protocols with sliding windows. Suppose that more
than L(q˜c − B) idle slots have occurred before the end
of a review phase. Then, a deviating node, knowing that
a punishment will not occur regardless of the outcome in
the remaining slots of the review phase, can increase its
transmission probability for the remainder of the review phase
to obtain a payoff gain. We can make a protocol based on a
review strategy robust to such a manipulation by having sliding
windows for review phases. In a review strategy with sliding
windows, a review phase begins in each slot unless there is a
new or ongoing punishment. Once the idle slot ratio test based
on the recent L signals fails, a review stops and punishment
occurs for M slots. Once a punishment phase ends, a review
phase begins in each slot until another punishment occurs. A
detailed analysis of this protocol is left for future research.
C. Numerical Results
We provide numerical results to demonstrate the findings
on DP protocols with public signals. Again, we consider a
network with N = 5 and pc = 1/N = 0.2 while varying pd
and the protocol parameters.
Fig. 7 plots P˜f and P˜m against the length of a review phase
L for B = 0.1 and 0.25 when pd = 0.7. As in the case of
private signals, P˜f tends to decrease with L and approaches
zero for large L. Also, P˜f is smaller for a larger margin
of error B. Note that the upper threshold for B to yield
limL→∞ P˜m(B,L; pd) = 0 in Lemma 2 is q˜c − q˜d = 0.2048.
We can see that when B is larger than this threshold, P˜m
tends to increases with L and approaches 1 for large L. On the
contrary, when B is smaller than the threshold, P˜m approaches
zero for large L, making the test asymptotically perfect.
Fig. 8 plots the minimum length of a reciprocation phase
⌈M˜min(B,L; pd)⌉ to have a DP protocol as a function of
the length of a review phase L. We can see that for fixed
pd = 0.7, a longer reciprocation phase is needed for larger
B, except when L is small, and that DP protocols cannot
be constructed with some small values of L when B = 0.1
(displayed as ⌈M˜min(B,L; pd)⌉ = 0). Also, when B = 0.1,
a longer reciprocation phase is needed for pd = 1 than
for pd = 0.7. The efficiency loss of DP protocols with the
minimum length of a reciprocation phase is shown in Fig. 9.
We can see that larger B results in smaller efficiency loss,
because P˜f is smaller for larger B as shown in Proposition
6. Also, efficiency loss approaches zero as L becomes large,
which is consistent with Proposition 7.
VII. EXTENSION TO A CSMA/CA NETWORK WITH
SELFISH NODES
In this section, we discuss how the proposed protocols
based on a review strategy can be modified for a CSMA/CA
network. In [9], the authors consider a CSMA/CA network
in which a selfish node uses a fixed contention window size.
They show a discrepancy between NE and Pareto optimum.
The contention window size of each node at the unique PO
outcome is denoted by W ∗, which results in a transmission
probability pc = 2/(W ∗ + 1). The optimal payoff uPO, i.e.,
the throughput at Pareto optimum, can be computed using Eq.
(1) of [9], based on the model of [29].
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Fig. 7. P˜f (B,L) and P˜m(B,L; pd) versus the length of a review phase L when pd = 0.7.
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Fig. 8. The minimum length of a punishment phase ⌈M˜min(B,L; pd)⌉ versus the length of a review phase L: (a) pd = 0.7, and (b) B = 0.1.
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Fig. 9. Efficiency loss C(σ˜r) versus the length of a review phase L: (a) pd = 0.7, and (b) B = 0.1.
A review strategy for a CSMA/CA network can be described
as follows, assuming private signals (i.e., sensing information
is private). At the beginning, nodes are synchronized to start
a review phase. In a review phase, which lasts for L time
period, each node sets its window size at W ∗. After a review
phase, each node computes its actual throughput, denoted by
τi, and compares it with uPO, the expected throughput when
no node has deviated from W ∗. A deviating node chooses
its window size W d smaller than W ∗ in order to increase its
transmission probability from pc and thus to obtain a higher
throughput. Since a deviation decreases the throughput of the
well-behaved nodes, we can design a test such that the test
performed by node i is passed if and only if τi > uPO −
B for some constant B ∈ (0, uPO). If the test of node i is
passed, node i moves to a cooperation phase during which it
continues to set its window size at W ∗. Otherwise, it moves
to a punishment phase during which it sets its window size at
the minimum value 1. A reciprocation phase lasts for M time
period, and a new review phase begins after a reciprocation
phase.
As in a slotted Aloha network, τi converges almost surely
to uPO as L goes to infinity, and thus the proposed test can be
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made asymptotically perfect by choosing an appropriate value
of B. Hence, when window sizes take discrete values, we can
construct a protocol that is DP against any constant deviation
strategy and achieves a small efficiency loss, following a
similar approach to Theorem 2. We omit the details due to
lack of space.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is well-known that the decentralized operation of multiple
access communication systems with selfish nodes often results
in an inefficient use of a shared medium. To overcome this
problem, we have proposed new classes of slotted MAC pro-
tocols that are robust to selfish manipulation while achieving
near-optimality. The proposed protocols are based on the idea
of a review strategy in the theory of repeated games. With
the proposed protocols, nodes perform a statistical test to
determine whether a deviation has occurred and trigger a pun-
ishment when they conclude so. We have provided conditions
under which we can design deviation-proof protocols with a
small efficiency loss and illustrated the results with particular
statistical tests. Our framework and design methodology are
not limited to multiple access communications. They can be
applied to other networking and communication scenarios in
which agents obtain imperfect signals about the decisions of
other agents and a deviation influences the distribution of
signals.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Choose arbitrary ǫ > 0 and δ > 0. Define pǫ ,
pc + ǫ/(1 − pc)N−1. Note that pǫ is the minimum deviation
probability with which a deviating node gains at least ǫ in a
slot when other nodes transmit with probability pc. Choose
B ∈ (0, ǫ/(N − 1)). Note that qc − qd ≥ ǫ/(N − 1) for all
pd ∈ [pǫ, 1]. Define
gˆ(B,L) , (1− Pf (B,L))
N−1
N − (1− pc) (1− Pf (B,L))
− Pm(B,L; pǫ).
Since Pm(B,L; pd) is non-increasing in pd, we have
g(B,L; pd) ≥ gˆ(B,L) for all pd ∈ [pǫ, 1], where
g(B,L; pd) is defined in (3). Also, by Lemma 1, we have
limL→∞ Pf (B,L) = 0 and limL→∞ Pm(B,L; pǫ) = 0.
Therefore, limL→∞ gˆ(B,L) = pc, and thus there exists L1
such that g(B,L; pd) > 0 for all pd ∈ [pǫ, 1], for all
L ≥ L1. Define Mˆ(L) , ⌈(1 − pc)L/gˆ(B,L)⌉. Since
Mˆ(L) ≥ Mmin(B,L; pd) for all pd ∈ [pǫ, 1], protocol
σr(B,L, Mˆ(L)) is DP against all constant strategies using
pd ∈ [pǫ, 1], for all L ≥ L1.
Since C(σr) is non-decreasing in M , we have
0 ≤ C(σr(B,L, Mˆ(L))) ≤
N ((1 − pc)L/gˆ(B,L) + 1)
L+ ((1 − pc)L/gˆ(B,L) + 1)
×(1− pc)
N−1
[
pcPf − (1− Pf )
N−1
N + (1− Pf )
]
.
Therefore, limL→∞ Ps(σr) = 0, and there exists L2 such that
C(σr) < δ for all L ≥ L2. Choose L ≥ max{L1, L2} and
M = Mˆ(L). Then σr(B,L,M) is DP against all constant
strategies using pd ∈ [pǫ, 1] and satisfies C(σr) < δ. Finally,
note that the payoff gain from deviating to a constant strategy
using pd ∈ [0, pǫ) is bounded above by ǫ. Hence, σr(B,L,M)
is robust ǫ-DP and δ-PO. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Consider the problem of a deviating node maximizing its
payoff given that all the other nodes use a review strategy
σ˜r(B,L,M), i.e., maxσ∈Σi U(σ; σ˜r). We can define a state
space with total L(L + 1)/2 +M states, where a state is a
pair consisting of the slot position and the number of idle slots
since the beginning of the current review phase in the case of
a review phase while it is the slot position in the case of a
punishment phase. By the principle of dynamic programming,
we can obtain a stationary optimal strategy, denoted by σ∗.
Let pt be the expected value of the transmission probability
of a node using σ∗ in slot t of a review phase (conditional on
null history) when other nodes follow σ˜r. Let It = χ{zt = 0}.
Since E[It] = (1− pt)(1 − pc)N−1, we have
U(σ∗; σ˜r) =
(1− pc)N−1
∑τ+L
t=τ+1 pt
L+ P ∗fM
=
L(1− pc)
N−1 − E
[∑τ+L
t=τ+1 It
]
L+ P ∗fM
, (9)
where τ + 1 is the first slot of a review phase and P ∗f is the
punishment probability when the deviating node uses σ∗, i.e.,
P ∗f = Pr
{∑τ+L
t=τ+1 It ≤ L(q˜c −B)
}
. Since
∑τ+L
t=τ+1 It ≥ 0,
using Markov’s inequality, we have
E
[
τ+L∑
t=τ+1
It
]
≥ (1− P ∗f )L(q˜c −B). (10)
Combining (9) and (10), we obtain
U(σ; σ˜r) ≤
Lqc + P
∗
f (1− pc)
NL+ (1 − P ∗f )BL
L+ P ∗fM
(11)
for all σ ∈ Σi.
Choose arbitrary ǫ > 0 and δ > 0. Following [20], we relate
the choice of M and B to L as follows:
B = βLρ−1, β > 0,
1
2
< ρ < 1
M = µL, µ > 0
Fix β, ρ, and µ such that β > 0, 1/2 < ρ < 1, and µ > N−1.
By Chebychev’s inequality,
P˜f (B,L) ≤
q˜c(1− q˜c)
B2L
=
q˜c(1− q˜c)
β2L2ρ−1
. (12)
Also, note that
C(σ˜r) =
NP˜fMqc
L+ P˜fM
=
NP˜fµqc
1 + P˜fµ
. (13)
Since P˜f (B,L) in (12) converges to zero as L goes to infinity,
we can achieve an arbitrarily small efficiency loss in (13) by
choosing sufficiently large L. In other words, for any δ > 0,
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there exists L′δ such that C(σ˜r) < δ for all L ≥ L′δ. With
µ > N − 1, the upper bound on the deviation payoff in (11)
qc + P
∗
f (1− pc)
N + (1− P ∗f )βL
ρ−1
1 + P ∗f µ
is decreasing in P ∗f . Thus, the deviation payoff is bounded
above by qc + βLρ−1.
Choose L such that
L ≥ max
{
L′δ, L
′
Nǫ/2,
(2β
ǫ
) 1
1−ρ
}
.
Since L ≥ L′Nǫ/2, we have
qc −
ǫ
2
< U(σ˜r; σ˜r) ≤ U(σ∗; σ˜r). (14)
Since L ≥ (2β/ǫ)1/(1−ρ), we have
U(σ∗; σ˜r) ≤ qc + βL
ρ−1 ≤ qc + ǫ/2. (15)
Then, by (14) and (15), we obtain an upper bound on the
deviation gain as
U(σ∗; σ˜r)− U(σ˜r; σ˜r) ≤ ǫ,
which proves that σ˜r(B,L,M) is an ǫ-NE. Lastly, since L ≥
L′δ, we have C(σ˜r) < δ, and thus σ˜r(B,L,M) is δ-PO.
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